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MENTAL ILLNESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION:
THE DUTY TO REPORT A FELLOW LAWYER 
TO THE LAW SOCIETY
ANDREW FLAVELLE MARTIN*
Lawyers have a largely overlooked duty to report other lawyers to the law society in a range
of circumstances. This duty contemplates mental illness, explicitly or implicitly, as a
reportable condition and thus engages issues of stigma and discrimination. This article
analyzes this reporting duty with a focus on its implications for lawyers with disabilities. The
article begins by examining the history and text of the rule and considering several legal
problems it presents. It then canvasses law societies’ duties to their members with
disabilities under human rights law and analyzes how the duty to report interacts with
human rights law. It concludes by making recommendations for law societies, including
amendments to the rule containing the reporting duty.
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I.  INTRODUCTION
As members of a self-regulating profession, Canadian lawyers have duties not only to the
client but also to the administration of justice, the profession, and the law society as the
regulator. One of these is the duty to report other lawyers to the law society in a range of
circumstances. The rule encapsulating this duty is sometimes derisively referred to as a
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“snitch” rule.1 Nonetheless, the reportable information captured by this rule appears to be
essential to fulfilling the law society’s statutory mandate to regulate the profession in the
public interest.2 Unfortunately, this reporting duty is poorly understood and largely absent
from the Canadian legal literature and case law.3 This near-absence is problematic because
these rules deal explicitly or implicitly with, among other things, mental illness — engaging
issues of stigma and discrimination.
Indeed, there is now a broad consensus that lawyers are at a disproportionate risk for
mental illness and that the actual and perceived risk of stigma and discrimination deters
lawyers from disclosing that illness and seeking treatment.4 Likewise, there is recognition
that law societies as regulators must continue to re-examine their approaches to mental
illness within the profession.5
In this article, I provide an analysis of this reporting duty with a focus on its implications
for lawyers with disabilities. In Part II, I examine the history and text of the rule and consider
several legal problems it presents. I draw on the case law and literature to identify several
areas for improvement. In Part III, I assess the compliance of the rule with human rights law.
I emphasize that undue hardship for regulators of self-governing professions constitutes harm
to the public interest and demonstrate that human rights considerations created a duty to
accommodate in the investigatory, capacity, and disciplinary processes. I explain that, while
the rule prior to 2016 amendments breached human rights law, the amended version is
compliant. Then in Part IV, I consider the rule’s compliance with the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms.6 Although the Charter analysis and human rights analysis are distinct,
I similarly conclude that, while the previous rule unjustifiably infringed section 15 of the
Charter, the current rule is Charter-compliant. Finally, in Part V, I make recommendations
for law societies, including amendments to the rule containing the reporting duty. 
1 See e.g. Richard Devlin, Jocelyn Downie & Sheila Wildeman, “Self-Regulation, Professional
Responsibility and the Duty to Report” (2016) 35:2 Society Record 20, noting (but not endorsing)
criticism of the rule.
2 See e.g. Law Society Act, RSO 1990, c L.8, s 4.2, para 3: “The Society has a duty to protect the public
interest”; Devlin, Downie & Wildeman, ibid.
3 I will discuss these articles and cases below.
4 See e.g. Law Society of British Columbia, Mental Health Task Force, First Interim Report of the Mental
Health Task Force (Chair: Brook Greenberg) at paras 10–18 (incidence), 19–25 (stigma), online: <www.
lawsociety.bc.ca/Website/media/Shared/docs/initiatives/MentalHealthTaskForceInterim
Report2018.pdf> [Interim Greenberg Report]; Law Society of Upper Canada, Mental Health Strategy
Task Force, Final Report to Convocation (Chair: Will McDowell) at 2, online: <lawsocietyontario.
azureedge.net/media/lso/media/legacy/pdf/c/convocation-april-2016-mental-health.pdf> [McDowell
Report]; Megan Seto, “Killing Ourselves: Depression as an Institutional, Workplace and Professionalism
Problem” (2012) 2:2 Western J Leg Studies at 3–8; Stephanie Nemeth, “Addressing the Elephant in the
Legal Profession: The Lawyer’s Struggle with Mental Health,” online: Saskatchewan Law Review
Comments <sasklawreview.ca/comment/addressing-the-elephant-in-the-legal-profession-the-lawyers-
struggle-with-mental-heath-.php>; Darena Muça, “Elevated Incidence of Mental Illness in the Legal
Profession,” online: McGill Journal of Law and Health Blog <mjlh.mcgill.ca/2019/11/28/elevated-
incidence-of-mental-illness-in-the-legal-profession/>; Jim Middlemiss, “Mental Health’s Toll”
Canadian Lawyer (20 May 2019), online: <www.canadianlawyermag.com/news/opinion/mental-healths
-toll/276099>.
5 See e.g. McDowell Report, ibid at 2: “Regulators must reflect on the relevance and importance of mental
health to the ability of individuals to meet their professional responsibilities and to serve the public.”
See also Interim Greenberg Report, ibid at paras 33–48.
6 Sections 1, 15, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK),
1982, c 11 [Charter].
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While I ultimately conclude that 2016 amendments to the rule are sufficient to comply
with human rights law, I argue that there are further steps that law societies should take to
meet the spirit of human rights legislation. I also argue that there remain more fundamental
flaws in the rule itself which detract from its ability to effectively fulfill its potential as a tool
for the law societies’ regulation of the legal profession in the public interest.
At the outset, I note that my focus in this article is the iteration of this reporting rule that
is included in the Model Code of Professional Conduct of the Federation of Law Societies
of Canada.7 This model rule binds lawyers only to the extent it is incorporated into provincial
and territorial rules of professional conduct. As I will demonstrate next, however, this model
rule is followed closely in all Canadian jurisdictions with little variation (with the partial
exception of Quebec) and indeed validates the unifying aspirations of the Model Code itself.
It is also important at the outset to identify a meaning for the term “mental illness.” The
United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities states that “[p]ersons
with disabilities include those who have long-term physical, mental, intellectual or sensory
impairments which in interaction with various barriers may hinder their full and effective
participation in society on an equal basis with others.”8 Similarly, the Public Health Agency
of Canada describes mental illnesses as “characterized by alterations in thinking, mood or
behaviour — or some combination thereof — associated with significant distress and
impaired functioning … including mood disorders, schizophrenia, anxiety disorders,
personality disorders, eating disorders and addictions.”9 The inclusion of alcoholism and
other addictions is recognized in Canadian law.10
II.  TEXT AND HISTORY OF RULE 7.1-3
In this part, I set out the text and history of the rule on the duty to report, identify the key
features, and provide several critiques. This material provides essential background for my
analysis in the remainder of the article.
A. THE CURRENT RULE
Rule 7.1-3 of the FLSC Model Code requires lawyers to report other lawyers to the law
society in a range of circumstances, under the heading “Duty to Report”:
Unless to do so would be unlawful or would involve a breach of solicitor-client privilege, a lawyer must
report to the Society:
(a) the misappropriation or misapplication of trust monies;
7 Federation of Law Societies of Canada, Model Code of Professional Conduct (Ottawa: Federation of
Law Societies of Canada, 2009), last amended 2019, r 7.1-3, online: <www.flsc.ca/wp-conten/uploads/
2019/11/Model-Code-October-2019.pdf> [FLSC Model Code].
8 13 December 2006, 2515 UNTS 3, art 1 (entered into force 3 May 2008).
9 Public Health Agency of Canada, The Human Face of Mental Health and Mental Illness in Canada,
2006 (Ottawa: Public Health Agency of Canada, 2006) at 2, online: <www.publications.gc.ca/site/
eng/9.688719/publication.html>.
10 See e.g. Canadian Human Rights Act, RSC 1985, c H-6, s 25: “disability means any previous or existing
mental or physical disability and includes disfigurement and previous or existing dependence on alcohol
or a drug” [emphasis added].
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(b) the abandonment of a law practice;
(c) participation in criminal activity related to a lawyer’s practice;
(d) conduct that raises a substantial question as to another lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or
competency as a lawyer;
(e) conduct that raises a substantial question about the lawyer’s capacity to provide professional
services; and
(f) any situation in which a lawyer’s clients are likely to be materially prejudiced.11
Among other things, the commentary specifies that “the report must be made without malice
or ulterior motive” and that “[n]othing in this rule is meant to interfere with the lawyer-client
relationship.”12 The commentary also emphasizes the importance of early intervention.13
Every law society in common-law Canada has adopted some form of rule 7.1-3, with
minor variation. The Law Society of British Columbia is stricter in two respects.14 First, its
rule 7.1-3(a) refers to “a shortage of trust monies,”15 not merely “the misappropriation or
misapplication of trust monies.”16 Second, it adds a seventh category, “(a.1) a breach of
undertaking or trust condition that has not been consented to or waived.”17 Conversely, the
Law Society of Ontario is less strict. Its rule 7.1-3(c) refers not to participation in any
criminal activity related to a lawyer’s practice, but only to “participation in serious criminal
activity related to a licensee’s practice.”18 Likewise, its rule 7.1-3(f) refers not to the
likelihood of clients being “materially prejudiced,” but only “severely prejudiced.”19
However, neither law society varies rule 7.1-3(e), which will be the focus of my analysis.
Quebec’s analogous provision is found in the Code of Professional Conduct of Lawyers:
Subject to the lawyer’s duty of confidentiality to a client, the lawyer must inform the syndic of the Barreau
about the occurrence of any of the following situations involving another lawyer:
(1) the unlawful custody or use of monies or other property held in trust;
(2) the termination of the practice of the profession;
11 FLSC Model Code, supra note 7, r 7.1-3.
12 Ibid, r 7.1-3, commentaries 1–2.
13 Ibid, r 7.1-3, commentary 1: 
Unless a lawyer who departs from proper professional conduct or competence is checked at
an early stage, loss or damage to clients or others may ensue. Evidence of minor breaches may,
on investigation, disclose a more serious situation or may indicate the commencement of a
course of conduct that may lead to serious breaches in the future.
14 As I will discuss below, British Columbia is the one jurisdiction that omits what is FLSC Model Code
r 7.1-3(e), “conduct that raises a substantial question about the lawyer’s capacity to provide professional
services.”
15 The Law Society of British Columbia, Code of Professional Conduct for British Columbia (Vancouver:
Law Society of British Columbia, 2013), last amended December 2019, online: <www.lawsociety.bc.ca/
support-and-resources-for-lawyers/act-rules-and-code/code-of-professional-conduct-for-british-
columbia/>.
16 FLSC Model Code, supra note 7, r 7.1-3(a).
17 As noted by Jean-Michel Montbriand, “L’obligation des members d’un ordre professionnel de dénoncer
le comportement dérogatoire d’un autre membre” (2019) 458 Barreau du Québec Service de la formation
continue 175 at 227, 235–36.
18 Law Society of Ontario, Rules of Professional Conduct (Toronto: Law Society of Ontario, 2000), last
amended 2019, online: <lso.ca/about-lso/legislation-rules/rules-of-professional-conduct> [emphasis
added]. See John Chapman, “Am I My Partner’s Keeper? The Duty to Report a Colleague” (2013) 92:3
Can Bar Rev 611 at 628.
19 Chapman, ibid at 628, n 57.
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(3) the inability to practise the profession;
(4) participation in an unlawful act when practising the profession;
(5) a health condition that could materially prejudice a client;
(6) conduct that raises a doubt as to his honesty, loyalty or competence; or
(7) the performance of any act whose nature or seriousness is such that it could adversely affect the
honour, dignity or reputation of the profession or the public’s confidence in the profession.20
Notably, the Quebec provision refers both to “the inability to practice the profession” and to
“a health condition that could materially prejudice a client.”21 Jean-Michel Montbriand
argues that paragraph 7 is very different from 7.1-3(f) and much broader than the FLSC
Model Code rule.22
This rule is not unique among common-law jurisdictions. For example, rule 8.3(a) of the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct of the American Bar Association provides that “[a]
lawyer who knows that another lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional
Conduct that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or
fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall inform the appropriate professional authority.”23
Similar rules apply to barristers and solicitors in England and Wales.24
B. HISTORY OF THE RULE
Like most of the rules of professional conduct, the history of what is now FLSC Model
Code rule 7.1-3 can be split into two periods: before and after the adoption of the FLSC
Model Code. Before the Model Code, which was intended to promote consistency among law
society rules across Canadian provinces and territories, I focus on the history of the Ontario
version of the rule by the Law Society of Upper Canada (LSUC) (as the Law Society of
Ontario was then known). This is because the current Canadian rule appears to originate in 
20 CQLR c B-1, r 3.1, s 134 [Quebec Code].
21 Ibid.
22 Montbriand, supra note 17 at 226.
23 American Bar Association, “Rule 8.3: Reporting Professional Misconduct,” online: <www.american
bar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_conduct/
rule_8_3_reporting_professional_misconduct.html> [ABA Model Rules]; Chapman, supra note 18 at
627. See also Montbriand, supra note 17 at 190–91, noting the similarity of the ABA rule.
24 Outcome 10.4 of the Code of Conduct of the Solicitors’ Regulatory Authority requires: “you report to
the SRA promptly, serious misconduct by any person or firm authorised by the SRA, or any employee,
manager or owner of any such firm (taking into account, where necessary, your duty of confidentiality
to your client).” (Solicitors Regulatory Authority, SRA Code of Conduct 2011, version 21, online:
<www.sra.org.uk/solicitors/handbook/code/content.page>. Chapman, supra note 18 at 627 refers to an
earlier version). Similarly, rule C66 of the Code of Conduct of the United Kingdom  Bar Standards
Board provides that “you must report to the Bar Standards Board if you have reasonable grounds to
believe that there has been serious misconduct by a barrister or a registered European lawyer, a BSB
entity, manager of a BSB entity or an authorised (non-BSB) individual who is working as a manager or
an employee of a BSB entity.” (Bar Standards Board, Bar Standards Board Code of Conduct, 9th ed,
being Part II of the Bar Standards Board Handbook, 4th ed, online: <www.barstandardsboard.org.uk/
regulatory-requirements/bsb-handbook/> [BSB Code of Conduct]). See also rule C67: “You must never
make, or threaten to make, a report under Rule rC66 without a genuine and reasonably held belief that
Rule rC66 applies.” And rule C69: “You must not victimise anyone for making in good faith a report
under Rule C66.” John Chapman has noted that these rules are similar to FLSC rule 7.1-3: Chapman,
supra note 18 at 627–28. 
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a 1965 ruling of the LSUC Professional Conduct Committee, first published in the LSUC
Professional Conduct Handbook of 1973:
Unless it be privileged or otherwise unlawful it is proper for any member to bring to the attention of the
Society any instance involving or appearing to involve professional misconduct or conduct unbecoming a
barrister, solicitor or student-at-law or reflecting on the honour of the Bar and the duty of every member to
bring such instances to the Society’s attention when they involve shortage of trust funds.25
Note that the ruling differentiated between two categories of reporting. Reporting was
“proper,” in other words discretionary, where there was “any instance involving or appearing
to involve professional misconduct or conduct unbecoming a barrister, solicitor or student-at-
law or reflecting on the honour of the Bar.”26 In contrast, reporting was a “duty,” in other
words mandatory, only where the situation “involve[d] shortage of trust funds.”27
In 1978, the Ontario reporting provision became a commentary to a rule, the rule itself
being simply that “[t]he lawyer should assist in maintaining the integrity of the profession
and should participate in its activities.”28 Reporting was mandatory not only where there was
a shortage of trust funds but also in any instance “[w]here … there is a reasonable likelihood
that someone will suffer serious damage as a consequence of an apparent breach,” with a
trust shortage being the example given.29 This was also the first appearance of the
qualification that “[i]n all cases the report must be made bona fide without malice or ulterior
motive.”30
In 1998, the Ontario rule was amended to specify that it was not to change the solicitor-
client relationship and to add several more examples that would trigger the reporting duty:
“misappropriation or misapplication of trust monies; the abandonment of a law practice;
25 Law Society of Upper Canada, Professional Conduct Handbook (1 January 1973) at 73, Ruling 33 [1973
Handbook]; Darryl Robinson, “Ethical Evolution: The Development of the Professional Conduct
Handbook of the Law Society of Upper Canada” (1995) XXIX Law Society of Upper Canada Gazette
162 at 186. Montbriand dates the corresponding Quebec rule back to 1967: Montbriand, supra note 17
at 183.
26 1973 Handbook, ibid.
27 Ibid. See e.g. Chapman, supra note 18 at 625: these provisions “historically contained a dividing line:
subject to the issue of possibly breaching client confidences, it was mandatory for a lawyer to report
misconduct by a fellow lawyer in certain limited circumstances but in the vast majority of instances
reporting was discretionary. This division also continues under the Model Code.” See also Montbriand,
supra note 17 at 202: “C\ela dit, il faut d’abord rappeler que ces différentes normes ne visent qu’à tenter
de déterminer quand un professionnel est obligé d’en dénoncer un autre. Mais, peu importe la norme,
tout professionnel peut en tout temps volontairement procéder à une telle dénonciation” [emphasis in
original] [“That said, it should first be remembered that these different standards are only intended to
try to determine when one professional must report another. But, regardless of the standard, any
professional can voluntarily make such a report at any time.” – translated by author].
28 Law Society of Upper Canada, Professional Conduct Handbook (December 1978) at 45, r 14,
commentary 1. 
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid. See also Montbriand, supra note 17 at 260: “Bien que la dénonciation d’un acte dérogatoire sera
très souvent perçue par le professionnel dénoncé comme ayant été faite dans le but de nuire, ce sentiment
ne sera évidemment pas en soi suffisant pour qualifier ladite dénonciation de représailles” [citation
omitted] [“Although the reporting of a derogatory act will very often be perceived by the professional
reported as having been made with the aim of causing harm, this feeling will obviously not in itself be
sufficient to qualify the said reporting as retaliation.” – translated by author]. Montbriand at 261–62
quotes from and discusses Avocats c Oberman, 2016 QCCDBQ 40 at paras 27–28, 30; see para 27: “il
est important que les membres du Barreau comprennent qu’il est inacceptable de menacer un confrère
ou une consœur de plainte disciplinaire.” [“it is important that members of the Bar understand that it is
unacceptable to threaten a colleague with a disciplinary complaint.” – translated by author].
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participation in serious criminal activity related to the lawyer’s practice; and the mental
instability of a lawyer of such a serious nature that this lawyer’s clients are likely to be
severely prejudiced.”31 As I will discuss below, this new language of “mental instability” was
problematic. 
The reporting provision became a freestanding rule in the 2000 LSUC Rules of
Professional Conduct,32 and did not substantively change before being largely incorporated
into rule 7.1-3 of the FLSC Model Code in 2014 (with the two differences mentioned above
— “serious” criminal activity and “severely” prejudiced).33
The only major amendment to the Model Code’s rule 7.1-3 since the adoption of the FLSC
Model Code occurred in March 2016. This amendment replaced “the mental instability of
a lawyer of such a nature that the lawyer’s clients are likely to be materially prejudiced”34
with “conduct that raises a substantial question about the lawyer’s capacity to provide
professional services.”35 It also rewrote the heading from “Duty to Report Misconduct” to
its current “Duty to Report.”36
C. UNCERTAINTY AND GAPS IN THE RULE
The text of the provision creates uncertainty in at least two respects. One is that the
provision does not indicate what threshold of certainty — for instance, suspicion or belief 
 or knowledge — subjective or objective — triggers the duty to report.37 Contrast this silence
with FLSC Model Code rule 5.6-3 on the security of court facilities: “[a] lawyer who has
reasonable grounds for believing that a dangerous situation is likely to develop at a court
facility must inform the persons having responsibility for security at the facility and give
particulars.”38 Contrast also with American Bar Association (ABA) Model rule 8.3, which
both specifies knowledge (“a lawyer who knows”) and gives a threshold (“raises a substantial
question”).39 Rule 7.1-3 appears to use a screening model, in which lawyers report the
possibility and the law society investigates to make a determination. Mandatory reporting
laws, such as those on children in need of protection, use this type of screening model, which
typically involves something less than knowledge or certainty, such as a reasonable suspicion
31 Law Society of Upper Canada, Professional Conduct Handbook (26 June 1998), 2nd ed, r 13,
commentary 1.
32 Law Society of Upper Canada, Rules of Professional Conduct (1 November 2000).
33 See above notes 18–19 and accompanying text.
34 FLSC Model Code, supra note 7, October 2014 [on file with author].
35 Ibid, March 2016 [on file with author]. British Columbia is the one jurisdiction that omits what is FLSC
Model Code, r 7.1-3(e), “conduct that raises a substantial question about the lawyer’s capacity to provide
professional services.”
36 Ibid, October 2014.
37 See e.g. Chapman, supra note 18 at 630. See also Montbriand, supra note 17 at 218–19: “Pour que la
survenance d’une situation constitue l’élément déclencheur du devoir de dénonciation, il faut en avoir
un certain niveau de connaissance, mais, dès la première lecture de l’article 134, on note tout de suite
l’absence apparente de termes qualifiant le degré de connaissance requis pour l’avocat dénonciateur.”
[“For the occurrence of a situation to constitute the trigger for the duty to report, it is necessary to have
a certain level of knowledge, but, from the first reading of section 134, we immediately note the apparent
absence of terms qualifying the degree of knowledge required for the reporting lawyer.” – translated by
author] For a comparison among Quebec professions, see Montbriand, supra note 17 at 202–18.
38 FLSC Model Code, supra note 7, r 5.6-3 [emphasis added].
39 ABA Model Rules, supra note 23. Contrast also the rule for barristers in England and Wales, which
specifies reasonable belief (“reasonable grounds to believe”): BSB Code of Conduct, supra note 24, r
C66.
666 ALBERTA LAW REVIEW (2021) 58:3
or a reasonable belief.40 As with mandatory reporting laws, this threshold is a policy decision
about the desired level of false positives and false negatives.41 
The provision also leaves uncertainty about how quickly the report must be made.
Montbriand argues that the Quebec rule “laisse croire, sans le préciser, à une exigence, d’agir
avec une certaine célérité” [“suggests, without specifying it, a requirement, to act with a
certain speed”]42 — although he notes that “[d]’ailleurs, l’absence de critères spécifiques
quant au délai pour dénoncer ne devrait pas être perçue comme permettant de passer outre
à ce devoir sans conséquence aucune” [“moreover, the absence of specific criteria as to the
deadline for reporting should not be seen as allowing this duty to be ignored without any
consequences”].43 In contrast, mandatory reporting laws in Ontario use terms such as “as
soon as possible,” “immediately,” and “promptly,” and some indicate a specific time period,
such as within seven days or thirty days.44 
An arguable gap in the rule is that it does not contain an anti-retaliation or anti-reprisal
provision. For example, the corresponding rule for barristers in England and Wales provides
that “[y]ou must not victimise anyone for making in good faith a report.”45 Similarly, the
Ontario Human Rights Code provides that “[e]very person has a right to claim and enforce
his or her rights under this Act, to institute and participate in proceedings under this Act and
to refuse to infringe a right of another person under this Act, without reprisal or threat of
reprisal for so doing.”46 While the law societies would be unable to create an offence for
retaliation (but would be able to lobby the legislatures for such measures), they could specify
in their rules of professional conduct that retaliation constitutes professional misconduct.
In contrast, the Quebec provision is accompanied by a general non-reprisal provision.47
Interestingly, Montbriand has suggested that reprisal or a threat of reprisal would constitute
misconduct even absent an express provision to that effect, given the importance of the
reporting duty.48 With respect to Montbriand, I would argue that an explicit rule against
reprisal, even if legally unnecessary, has value as a signalling mechanism both as a
reassurance to reporting lawyers and as a deterrent to those who might engage in reprisal.
40 See e.g. Andrew Flavelle Martin, The Future of Mandatory Reporting Laws: Developing a Legal and
Policy Framework for Determining What Reporting Obligations to Impose on Professionals (SJD
Thesis, University of Toronto, 2017) at 11–12, 13–17, Table 1. Reasonable suspicion: see e.g. Child,
Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, SO 2017, Sch 1, c 14, s 125. Reasonable belief: see e.g. Health
Professions Procedural Code (Regulated Health Professions Act, SO 1991, Sch 2, c 18, s 85.1) (sexual
abuse by a health professional).
41 Martin, ibid at 11–12.
42 Montbriand, supra note 17 at 241 [translated by author].
43 Ibid [translated by author].
44 Martin, supra note 40 at 13–17, Table 1.
45 BSB Code of Conduct, supra note 24, r C69.
46 RSO 1990, c H.19, s 8.
47 Quebec Code, supra note 20, s 136, quoted by Montbriand, supra note 17 at 264: 
A lawyer who has been informed of an inquiry or a complaint regarding him must not
communicate, directly or indirectly, with the person who is the source of the inquiry or who
filed the complaint, unless he has the prior written permission of a syndic of the Barreau. 
Moreover, he must not intimidate a person or retaliate or threaten to retaliate against the person
because the person participated or cooperated or intends to participate or cooperate in such an
inquiry or complaint, reported or intends to report conduct contrary to this code, or availed
himself of a right or recourse set forth in a regulation adopted under the Professional Code
(chapter C-26) or the Act respecting the Barreau du Québec (chapter B-1). 
48 Montbriand, supra note 17 at 199.
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D. APPLICATION OF THE RULE
There are few reported decisions applying the provincial and territorial provisions
corresponding to rule 7.1-3, and these decisions provide little guidance.49 The earliest, and
most illuminating, is the decision of the LSUC Discipline Committee in Lang Michener (Re),
what became known as the “Lang Michener Affair.”50 Five partners in the firm, members of
the firm’s executive committee, were found to have committed professional misconduct by
failing to inform the law society that another partner, Martin Pilzmaker, may have assisted
his clients in immigration fraud.51 Critically, the discipline committee held that the duty to
report was triggered by serious suspicion alone and did not require certainty or knowledge: 
When the respondents became aware of circumstances which at least raised serious questions and suspicions
about Pilzmaker’s professional conduct, they had an overriding duty to do something about it…. [I]t is not
always necessary that a lawyer be convinced that there has been illegal professional activity or other
professional misconduct before that lawyer has a duty to inform the Society.52
The committee emphasized that reporting was necessary short of conclusive evidence:
“where there is substantial even though not conclusive evidence of serious unethical
behaviour.”53 While the panel focused on “whether or not the disclosure was timely, which
is to say was it made promptly,”54 it did not give an interpretation of what timely or promptly
means, concentrating on when the lawyers had learned enough to be required to report, not
how long passed between that time and the time the report was made.55
Following Lang Michener (Re), there are only two reported common-law decisions
involving a breach of the mandatory reporting duty. The first, Law Society of Prince Edward
Island v. Aylward,56 involved a lawyer who failed to report that his partner had
misappropriated trust funds.57 While the panel cited Lang Michener (Re) for the proposition
that the reporting duty was triggered by mere suspicion, as opposed to certainty,58 the facts
49 But see Law Society of Upper Canada v Farant, 2005 ONLSHP 31 at paras 89–90, emphasizing the
importance of this rule: 
Mr. Farant’s failures were ameliorated by his former partners and associates, his colleagues
at the successor law firm and the Law Society investigation team. Collectively, they reported
or investigated concerns about Mr. Farant’s conduct in a timely manner so that in the end, no
client’s monies were lost…. All of the lawyers and members of the Law Society who fulfilled
their duties to report and investigate Mr. Farant’s wrongful conduct, are to be commended.
Their timely reporting and investigation protected the public from existing harm and prevented
Mr. Farant from potential future difficulties.
50 Lang Michener (Re) (9 January 1990) [on file with author]. For a discussion see e.g. Christopher Moore,
The Law Society of Upper Canada and Ontario’s Lawyers, 1797-1997 (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1997) at 326–29; Stephen E Traviss, ed, Ontario Discipline Summaries, 1972-1992 (Toronto: Law
Society of Upper Canada, 1997) at 246–48.
51 Lang Michener (Re), ibid at 5–6.
52 Ibid at 12 [emphasis added].
53 Ibid at 15.
54 Ibid at 13.
55 But see Chapman, supra note 18 at 615, n 12: “The specific wording of the then commentary of the
Ontario Rules did not make it clear reporting was required but nevertheless a finding of professional
misconduct was made.”
56 [2001] LSDD No 48 (PEI Discipline Committee) [Aylward].
57 Ibid at para 1.
58 Ibid at para 99.
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were that the lawyer was certain of the misappropriation within 24 hours of his bookkeeper
raising her concerns.59 
The other reported common-law decision is Law Society of Alberta v. Chhoker.60 The
lawyer in Chhoker not only failed to inform the law society when another lawyer in the firm
asked him to modify documents relevant to an action against the firm by a former client, but
also he later failed to inform the law society when he learned that another lawyer had made
the modifications.61 The panel held that “[h]is duty to report was a continuing obligation, and
his failure to do so was a continuing breach of that obligation.”62 The threshold triggering the
duty, and the timeliness of the duty, was not at issue in Chhoker because the lawyer knew
immediately that the modifications were problematic.63 As the lawyer admitted this citation,
and had actual knowledge, there was understandably no discussion of the triggering threshold
or timeliness.
The Quebec case of Barreau du Québec (syndic adjoint) c. Boudreau64 is somewhat
similar to Chhoker. The lawyer in Boudreau was disciplined for misleading investigators
about his signature on a record (which signature had actually been falsified by his associate),
and for failing to report his associate for using the record to obtain a judgment.65 There is
little analysis, as the lawyer conceded his failure to report the misconduct.66
E. LITERATURE ON THE RULE
The rule has been largely ignored in the Canadian legal literature. The leading treatises
on Canadian legal ethics do little more than mention this duty.67 Other than a brief article by
Richard Devlin, Jocelyn Downie, and Sheila Wildeman, which focuses on the mental health
dimension, the only articles with any level of detail are by John Chapman and Jean-Michel
Montbriand.68 
59 Ibid at para 7. Aylward was also complicit by concealing the partner’s misappropriation: see
Montbriand, supra note 17 at 233–34.
60 2017 ABLS 4, penalty reported at 2017 ALBS 16 [Chhoker].
61 Ibid at paras 17–18.
62 Ibid at para 18, as noted by Montbriand, supra note 17 at 199–200.
63 Chhoker, ibid at paras 17–18. See also Montbriand, ibid at 230: “Une demande par un collègue pour
altérer des documents est, à l’évidence, un acte dérogatoire et, au surplus, illégal.” [“A request by a
colleague to alter documents is clearly a derogatory act and, moreover, illegal.” – translated by author]
64 2015 QCCDBQ 071 (merits) [Boudreau]; 2016 QCCDBQ 050 (penalty), discussed in Montbriand,
supra note 17 at 193, 198, 231, 232, 240.
65 Boudreau, ibid at para 1.
66 Ibid at para 2.
67 See e.g. Gavin MacKenzie, Lawyers & Ethics: Professional Responsibility and Discipline (Toronto:
Thomson Reuters Canada, 2020) (loose-leaf release 2020-5), 25.7 Responsibility to the Profession at
25-18 to 25-20; Mark M Orkin, Legal Ethics, 2d ed (Toronto: Thomson Reuters Canada, 2011) at 127;
Brent Olthuis, “Prosecutorial Conduct,” in Adam M Dodek, ed, Canadian Legal Practice: A Guide for
the 21st Century (Toronto: LexisNexis Canada, 2009) (loose-leaf updated 2020, release 75) ch 3 at paras
3.237– 3.239.
68 Devlin, Downie & Wildeman, supra note 1; Chapman, supra note 18; Montbriand, supra note 17. There
is one other article in a Canadian journal, but it focuses on a US case: Archie J Rabinowitz & Eric K
Gillespie, “‘Blowing the Whistle’ and the Lawyer’s Duty to Report” (1994) 7:2 Can JL & Jur 349, case
comment on Wieder v Skala, 609 NE (2d) 105 (NY 1992) at 351–52. Some other articles mention the
duty in passing: David Littlefield, “Silvini: Divided Loyalty” (1992) 9 CR (4th) 250 at 254; Jonnette
Watson Hamilton, “Protecting Confidentiality in Mandatory Mediation: Lessons from Ontario and
Saskatchewan” (1999) 24 Queen’s LJ 561 at 639–40; Margaret Ann Wilkinson, Christa Walker & Peter
Mercer, “Do Codes of Ethics Actually Shape Legal Practice?” (2000) 45:3 McGill LJ 645 at 659, n 59;
Alice Woolley, “Integrity in Zealousness: Comparing the Standard Conceptions of the Canadian and
American Lawyer” (1996) 9:1 Can JL & Jur 61 at 73 (on ABA r 8.3); Richard Haigh & Peter Bowal,
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Chapman focuses on the firm context, and particularly the duty of lawyers within a firm
to report a partner or associate, arguing that this context raises different considerations than
reporting any other lawyer.69 He suggests that “in the context of reporting a lawyer who is
not at the firm, if there is uncertainty on the obligation, the safe approach of reporting may
tend to be followed given that there will normally be little personal downside to reporting.”70
Chapman emphasizes that, in contrast, reporting a lawyer within the firm has personal and
financial implications.71 Indeed, he argues that the duty to report a colleague is more
important for deterrence than the duty to report any other lawyer.72
Montbriand considered the rule as part of a comprehensive examination of the duty of
professionals to report misconduct (“comportement dérogatoire”) by their colleagues.73 He
notes that reporting is important because clients are poorly situated to identify wrongdoing74
and is necessary in order to protect the public and promote public confidence in, and the
public image of, the profession.75 He emphasizes that the duty to report is a corollary of self-
regulation.76 He also emphasizes that the duty to report lies on the individual lawyer and
cannot be delegated or transferred to another lawyer,77 makes the important point that a
superior cannot release a lawyer from his or her obligation to report,78 and indeed notes that
in Quebec senior lawyers have a positive obligation to ensure that their junior colleagues
comply with their professional obligations.79 More specifically, he notes that the duty applies
even if it risks making the reporting lawyer a witness in her client’s matter.80
“Whistleblowing and Freedom of Conscience: Towards a New Legal Analysis” (2012) 35:1 Dal LJ 89
at n 52; Ryan Rempel, “1995 Survey of Decisions of the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal” (1996) 60 Sask
L Rev 1 at 15; Lois Maclean & John McNiven “The Complaint Resolution Project” (1995) 34:1 Alta
L Rev 54 at 58; Michael J Trebilcock, “Regulating the Market for Legal Services” (2008) 45:5 Alta L
Rev 215 at 226. David Tanovich incorporates the duty into his model code for law students: David M
Tanovich, “Learning to Act Like a Lawyer: A Model Code of Professional Responsibility for Law
Students” (2009) 27 Windsor YB Access Just 75 at 108–109.
69 Chapman, ibid at 617, 634–35.
70 Ibid at 630–31.
71 Ibid at 632.
72 Ibid. See also Montbriand, supra note 17 at 292, citing Chapman, ibid at 634.
73 Montbriand, ibid. 
74 Ibid at 192–93.
75 Ibid at 193–94, at 193 quoting Boudreau, supra note 64: “Il est du devoir de l’avocat de contribuer à la
protection du public et de dénoncer sans délai au syndic les actes dérogatoires commis par des confrères.
Agir autrement porte ombrage à l’image de la profession.”[“It is the duty of the lawyer to contribute to
the protection of the public and to report without delay to the syndic any derogatory acts committed by
colleagues. Acting differently brings shame upon the profession.” – translated by author]. See also
Montbriand at 251: “L’obligation de dénonciation d’un collègue fautif est, comme nous l’avons déjà vu,
un des mécanismes pour préserver l’honneur, la dignité et la réputation de la profession ET pour
maintenir le lien de confiance du public envers celle-ci” [emphasis in original] [“The obligation to report
a colleague at fault is, as we have already seen, one of the mechanisms to preserve the honor, dignity
and reputation of the profession AND to maintain the bond of public confidence in it.” – translated by
author].
76 Montbriand, ibid at 175. 
77 Ibid at 196–98. Montbriand at 198 suggests that there may be an exception where a lawyer knows that
another lawyer has made a report.
78 Ibid at 255: “Comme nous l’avons vu, l’obligation de dénonciation est personnelle et personne ne peut
l’assujettir à une quelconque autorisation ou autre forme de contrôle” [“As we have seen, the obligation
to report is personal and no one can subject it to any approval or other form of control” – translated by
author]. See also 284–86. (Indeed, as Montbriand notes at 291, under the Professional Code, CQLR c
C-26, s 188.2.1, discouraging a person from meeting her ethical obligations constitutes a provincial
offence.) See also FLSC Model Code, supra note 7, r 6.1-1: “A lawyer has complete professional
responsibility for all business entrusted to him or her.”
79 Montbriand, ibid at 295, quoting Quebec Code, supra note 20, s 6, which in English states that “[a]
lawyer who exercises authority over another lawyer must ensure that the framework within which such
other lawyer engages in his professional activities allows him to comply with his professional
obligations.” 
80 Montbriand, ibid at 195, quoting Drolet-Savoie c Avocats, 2004 QCTP 19 at para 34.
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Montbriand also relies on Chokker for the proposition that the duty is a continuing one81
and underlines that the correction of the misconduct (such as repayment of misappropriated
funds) does not neutralize the duty to report.82 While recognizing that the triggering threshold
is unclear, Montbriand suggests that, when in doubt, it is better to report than not to report.83
Interestingly, he suggests that a threat to report another lawyer constitutes misconduct
because it implies that the lawyer may not comply with the reporting obligation.84 
While Montbriand’s focus is on misconduct and not on mental health issues,85 he does
note that the latter are covered by the reporting duty.86 Montbriand ultimately concludes that
the duty to report, though not a complete solution, is an important tool to protect the public
interest.87
Devlin, Downie, and Wildeman, while recognizing that the duty to report is a corollary
of self-regulation, suggested several problems with the “mental instability” version of the
rule.88 Most importantly, it was discriminatory in singling out mental illness among other
factors potentially affecting a lawyer’s capacity to practice.89 Similarly, the heading (“Duty
to Report Misconduct”) implied that mental illness in itself constitutes misconduct.90 From
a functional perspective, “mental instability” is a term with no clear definition and a state that
lawyers are unqualified to assess.91 
Similar themes were emphasized in a recent report by the Mental Health Task Force of
the Law Society of British Columbia:
[T]he phrase “mental instability” in 7.1-3(d) is an emotionally charged term that connotes negative attitudes
toward mental health conditions and the people affected by them. Additionally, mental health is the only
condition, or “state of being” enumerated in 7.1-3, in contrast to the other items in the rule, which focus on
conduct. As such, 7.1-3(d) makes the unfounded and stigmatizing assumption that lawyers living with mental
health challenges present an elevated risk to the public.92
While acknowledging that “the Law Society must be aware of, and responsive to the ways
in which mental health and substance use issues may impact on a lawyer’s professional
conduct and competence,” the task force noted that “[t]he majority of lawyers living with a
81 Montbriand, ibid at 199–200, at 200 quoting Chhoker, supra note 60 at 18.
82 Montbriand, ibid at 295.
83 Ibid at 224. See also 229: “[e]nfin, en cas de doute, et afin notamment de faire en sorte de réaliser
l’accomplissement de l’objet de l’obligation de dénonciation, ne vaut-il pas mieux dénoncer plutôt que
de s’abstenir de le faire … ?” [“Finally, in case of doubt, and in particular in order to ensure that the
object of the duty to report is fulfilled, is it not better to report rather than to refrain from doing so …?”
– translated by author].
84 Ibid at 198.
85 Ibid at 177.
86 Ibid at 271.
87 Ibid at 303.
88 Devlin, Downie & Wildeman, supra note 1.
89 Ibid at 21.
90 Ibid at 21–22.
91 Ibid at 21.
92 Interim Greenberg Report, supra note 4 at para 151. Indeed, it was this report that recommended that
the Law Society of British Columbia adopt the updated rule from the FLSC Model Code: para 154.
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mental health condition are not at risk of acting unethically or unprofessionally, and it is
critically important that diagnosis is not incorrectly correlated with impairment.”93 
There is a rich United States literature on the corresponding ABA rule — “[a] lawyer who
knows that another lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct
that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a
lawyer in other respects, shall inform the appropriate professional authority”94 — but its
relevance for the Canadian context is limited. Three aspects are important for my purposes.
First and most important are the concerns, similar to those raised by Devlin, Downie, and
Wildeman in the Canadian context, that the ABA rule may increase stigma around mental
illness and that lawyers with mental illness may be disproportionately reported.95 
The second important aspect of the US literature is the assessment of the importance of
the rule. Many commentators agree that the reporting requirement is a necessary part of the
legal profession’s system of self-regulation96 and is integral to the profession’s ability to
police itself.97 Several commentators warn that failure to comply with the reporting duty
could result in the legal profession’s loss of its privilege of self-regulation.98 Similarly, the
reporting requirement is arguably essential to enhance the legal profession’s public image99
and to foster public confidence100 and trust in the legal profession.101 From a functional
perspective, reporting is necessary because lawyers have a special ability and opportunity
to detect and identify problematic conduct by other lawyers that is not shared by the public
at large.102 
93 Interim Greenberg Report, ibid, at 12, paras 37–38.
94 ABA Model Rules, supra note 23, r 8.3(a); Chapman, supra note 18 at 627. See also Montbriand, supra
note 17 at 190–91, noting the similarity of the ABA rule.
95 John V Jacobi, “Professionalism and Protection: Disabled Lawyers and Ethical Practice” (1998) 69 U
Pitt L Rev 567 at 572.
96 See e.g. Lonnie T Brown Jr, “Ending Illegitimate Advocacy: Reinvigorating Rule 11 Through
Enhancement of the Ethical Duty to Report” (2001) 62:5 Ohio St LJ 1555 at n 1; Michael A Fisher,
“Why Does Doing the Right Thing Have to be so Hard? A Law Firm Partner’s Difficult Decision on
Whether to Report Suspected Misconduct” (2004) 87:5 Marq L Rev 1005 at 1017; Douglas R
Richmond, “The Duty to Report Professional Misconduct: A Practical Analysis of Lawyer Self-
Regulation” (1999) 12 Geo J Leg Ethics 175 at 175 [Richmond, “A Practical Analysis”]; David C
Olsson, “Reporting Peer Misconduct: Lip Service to Ethical Standards is Not Enough” (1989) 31:3 Ariz
L Rev 657 at 659. 
97 See e.g. Parker D Eastin, “Should Kentucky Impose an Enforceable Duty on Lawyers to Report Other
Lawyers’ Professional Misconduct?” (1999) 87:4 Ky LJ 1271 at 1272.
98 See e.g. Michael Bloom & Carol Lynn Wallinger, “Lawyers and Alcoholism: Is it Time for a New
Approach?” (1988) 61 Temp L Rev 1409 at 1429; Cynthia L Gendry, “Ethics: An Attorney’s Duty to
Report the Professional Misconduct of Co-workers” (1994) 18 S Ill ULJ 603 at 606; Nikki Ott &
Heather Newton, “A Current Look at Model Rule 8.3: How is it Used and What are Courts Doing About
It?” (2003) 16 Geo J Leg Ethics 747 at 766; Richmond, “A Practical Analysis,” supra note 96 at 175;
Olsson, supra note 96 at 658.
99 See e.g. Eastin, supra note 97 at 1297; Arthur F Greenbaum, “The Attorney’s Duty to Report
Professional Misconduct: A Roadmap for Reform” (2003) 16 Geo J Leg Ethics 259 at 267–68; Ott &
Newton, supra note 98 at 766; Fisher, supra note 96 at 1017.
100 See e.g. Greenbaum, ibid at 264; Douglas R Richmond, “Associates as Snitches and Rats” (1997) 43
Wayne L Rev 1819 at 1848 [Richmond, “Snitches and Rats”].
101 See e.g. Thomas R DeBray Jr, “No One Likes a Tattletale: Why Alabama Should No Longer Force
Attorneys to Report the Professional Misconduct of Other Attorneys” (2009) 34 J Leg Prof 181.
102 See e.g. Bloom & Wallinger, supra note 98 at 1428; Eastin, supra note 97 at 1272; Alex B Long,
“Whistleblowing Attorneys and Ethical Infrastructures” (2009) 68:4 Md L Rev 786 at 799; Richmond,
“A Practical Analysis,” supra note 98 at 175.
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The third important aspect of the US literature is the array of proposed amendments to the
rule. These include clarifying the parameters “knows,”103 “substantial question,”104 and “as
a lawyer,”105 adding a specific timeliness requirement,106 adding a list of specific ethical
violations that would trigger the rule,107 and adding a prohibition against retaliation.108
Another is to add an exemption for lawyers in close personal relationships, such as
spouses.109
III.  RULE 7.1-3 AND HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
Having set out the text and history of what is now rule 7.1-3 in Part II, I turn next to an
analysis of rule 7.1-3 under contemporary human rights law.
I start with a brief canvass of the duties that law societies owe their members and
prospective members under human rights law. While this work is largely descriptive, it is
curiously absent from the literature and is necessary context for my analysis in the remainder
of this part.
Human rights law prohibits discrimination by self-governing professions to the extent of
undue hardship. For example, the Ontario Human Rights Code provides that “[e]very person
has a right to equal treatment with respect to membership in any trade union, trade or
occupational association or self-governing profession without discrimination.”110 The
unifying and distinguishing feature of human rights law as it applies to self-governing
professions is that undue hardship is evaluated not in terms of the typical factors of cost,
103 See e.g. Michael J Burwick, “You Dirty Rat!! Model Rule 8.3 and Mandatory Reporting of Attorney
Misconduct” (1994) 8 Geo J Leg Ethics 137 at 154. Although ABA rule 1.0(f) provides that “knows”
“denotes actual knowledge of the facts in question” and that “knowledge may be inferred from the
circumstances,” there is disagreement over where this lies on the spectrum between suspicion and
certainty: see e.g. Vincent R Johnson, “Legal Malpractice Litigation and the Duty to Report
Misconduct” (2011) 1 St. Mary’s J Leg Malpractice & Ethics 40 at 55; Greenbaum, supra note 99 at
291. Commentators also disagree as to whether “knowledge” is objective or subjective: see e.g. Douglas
R Richmond, “Law Firm Partners as Their Brothers’ Keepers” (2007) 96:2 Ky LJ 231 at 253
[Richmond, “Brothers’ Keepers”]; Richmond, “A Practical Analysis,” supra note 96 at 186.
104 See e.g. Eastin, supra note 97 at 1282, 1287. While the commentary to rule 8.3 provides that reporting
applies only “to those offences that a self-regulating profession must vigorously endeavor to prevent”
and that “ ‘substantial’ refers to the seriousness of the possible offense and not the quantum of evidence
of which the lawyer is aware” (ABA Model Rules, supra note 23, r 8.3, comment 3), uncertainty persists:
see e.g. Ott & Newton, supra note 98 at 751; Gerard E Lynch, “The Lawyer as Informer” (1986) 1986
Duke LJ 491 at 516.
105 See e.g. Lynch, ibid at 544. This phrase creates some uncertainty over whether, and what,
extraprofessional conduct triggers the duty: Johnson, supra note 103 at 69–70.
106 See e.g. Burwick, supra note 103 at 154; Laurel Fedder, “Obstacles to Maintaining the Integrity of the
Profession: Rule 8.3’s Ambiguity and Disciplinary Board Complacency” (2010) 23 Geo J Leg Ethics
571 at 582.
107 See e.g. Lynch, supra note 104 at 539; Greenbaum, supra note 99 at 289; Eastin, supra note 97 at 1287.
108 See e.g. Greenbaum, ibid at 322–25; Long, supra note 102 at 824; Richmond, “Snitches and Rats,”
supra note 100 at 1850. On retaliation generally, see e.g. Gendry, supra note 98 at 606; Richmond,
“Snitches and Rats,” supra note 100 at 1838. On discharge or expulsion, see e.g. Brown, supra note 96
at 1603; Eastin, supra note 97 at 1296; Lindsay Oldham & Christine Whitledge, “The Catch-22 of
Model Rule 8.3” (2002) 15 Geo J Leg Ethics 881 at 889; Long, supra note 102 at 797– 98; Ott &
Newton, supra note 98 at 753; Ryan Williams, “Reputation and the Rules: An Argument for A
Balancing Approach Under Rule 8.3 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct” (2008) 68 La L Rev
931 at 948; Richmond, “Brothers’ Keepers,” supra note 103 at 259.
109 Greenbaum, ibid. (I note here Greenbaum’s suggestion at 319 that such an exemption may not be
necessary because disciplinary boards likely already take such relationships into consideration when
determining whether to impose sanctions. However, transparency and clarity of expectations favour such
an exemption.)
110 Human Rights Code, supra note 46, s 6.
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health, and safety111 but instead in terms of harm to the public interest.112 This unique
conception of undue hardship follows clearly from the law society’s primary statutory duty
to protect the public interest. Nonetheless, a regulatory body must protect the public interest
while complying with human rights law; that is, the mandate to protect the public interest
does not allow a breach of human rights law.113
The duty to accommodate to the extent of undue hardship applies most clearly in
disciplinary and capacity proceedings. In disciplinary proceedings, this duty will most often
require a mitigation of penalty where disability, including mental illness, is a factor.114 In
particular, revocation will only be appropriate where it is necessary to maintain public
confidence in the profession.115 In the most severe cases, mental illness will only reduce the
penalty from revocation to permission to surrender.116 However, this duty to accommodate
disability will sometimes preclude a finding of misconduct altogether: where mental illness
has caused the conduct at issue, a finding of misconduct is itself contrary to the public
111 See e.g. ibid, s 17(2): “the cost, outside sources of funding, if any, and health and safety requirements,
if any.”
112 See e.g. Law Society of Ontario v Yantha, 2018 ONLSTH 94 at para 10 [Yantha]: “In the case of
regulatory proceedings by the Law Society, undue hardship arises when the public interest is harmed
by the accommodation.” Curiously, the case law on the law society’s duty to accommodate lawyers
comes almost as much from law society disciplinary decisions, primarily in Ontario, as from human
rights decisions. See also Law Society of Upper Canada v Czernick, 2010 ONLSHP 122 at para 44: “A
failure to fulfil such [professional] obligations that is caused by a disability must be accommodated by
the Law Society and this Panel, unless and to the extent that accommodation would cause undue
hardship in the form of harm to the public interest.” But see also MH v College of Nurses of Ontario,
2014 CanLII 57012 (Ont HPARB) at para 61 [emphasis added]: “The Board is satisfied … that the
Applicant’s desire to be registered with the College cannot be accommodated without undue hardship
upon the College and the public interest that the College is mandated to protect.”
113 See e.g. Fossum v Society of Notaries Public of British Columbia, 2011 BCHRT 310 at para 306, citing
Human Rights Code, RSBC 1996, c 210: 
The Society argues that it is statutorily required to ensure that its members are able to provide
services authorized by the Act. It is required to protect the public and it is a self-regulated
profession mandated to discipline its Members. This is accepted. However, the Society is required
to do so without breaching the Code. Section 4 of the Code states that “If there is a conflict
between this Code and any other enactment, this Code prevails.”
114 See e.g. Law Society of Ontario v Khan, 2018 ONLSTH 131 at paras 82, 84 [citations omitted] [Khan]:
Mental illness mitigates penalty not only “where the medical circumstances explained or contributed to
the misconduct, wholly or partly,” but also “where the illness did not directly cause the licensee’s
conduct, but nevertheless ‘set the stage’ in terms of poor practice or financial management, or created
personal circumstances that deserve compassionate treatment or recognition in assessing the total impact
of a fair penalty.” See also Law Society of Upper Canada v Ellis, 2016 ONLSTH 20 at para 36 [citations
omitted] [Ellis]: “while not excusing the misconduct, a health condition may assist in explaining why
the conduct occurred and was out of character, even if it does not remove the licensee’s ethical
responsibility for the misconduct.”
115 See e.g. Khan, ibid at paras 53, 66 [emphasis added]: 
[T]he Law Society and the Tribunal must accommodate the licensee up to the point of undue
hardship, if the individual can still carry out the essential duties of a licensee…. In assessing the
appropriate penalty, the duty of accommodation will be met if the individual circumstances … do
not satisfy the Tribunal that he or she can meet the essential duties of every licensee: to permit the
regulator to assure public confidence in the continued integrity of the legal professions and its
self-regulation. At that point, it constitutes undue hardship to the public interest to permit the
licensee to retain membership.
See also para 62: “The Law Society is entitled to assure the public that with accommodation, if
appropriate, individuals who are permitted to retain their status as licensees can perform the essential
duties of their profession, as set out in the professional conduct rules and the governing statute.” See also
Ellis, ibid at para 38: “[I]f the need to reassure the public of the integrity of the legal profession could
not be obviated without revocation or permission to surrender, this would cause undue hardship to the
Law Society and the public.”
116 See e.g. Yantha, supra note 112 at para 33. See also Law Society of Upper Canada v Adams, 2018
ONLSTH 20 at paras 61–63.
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interest.117 The duty to accommodate may also apply in the investigative and hearing
processes, for example requiring adjournments.118 Mental illness may well trigger capacity
proceedings, in which similar considerations of protection of the public interest and undue
hardship apply.119
A. THE LEGAL TESTS
The test for prima facie discrimination under human rights law, recently reaffirmed by the
Supreme Court of Canada in Stewart v. Elk Valley Coal Corp., requires that a person have
a protected characteristic, that they suffered an adverse impact, and that the former factored
into the latter.120 Chief Justice McLachlin for the majority emphasized that “stereotypical or
arbitrary decision making” or “[t]he existence of arbitrariness or stereotyping is not a stand-
117 Law Society of Upper Canada v Helen Patricia Luzius, 2013 ONLSHP 193 at para 50 [emphasis added]: 
An enlightened approach to issues of mental health within the profession cries out for a balancing
of interests between, on the one hand, the protection of the public in respect of inadequate legal
services and, on the other, the ability to regulate our members with compassion and insight. In
circumstances where it is demonstrated that there is a compelling nexus between the mental illness
and the alleged misconduct, it can neither be said to be just nor in the public interest to declare
a licensee guilty of professional misconduct.
See also Law Society of Upper Canada v Robinson, 2016 ONLSTH 200 at para 35 [citations omitted]: 
At issue in all of these cases is whether a licensee can be properly found to have engaged in
professional misconduct where the failure to fulfil professional obligations is caused by mental
illness. Though framed in different ways, all these cases recognize that it cannot be professional
misconduct to fail to do what one cannot do because of physical or mental illness. Interpreting the
Rules of Professional Conduct and the meaning of “professional misconduct” as used in s. 33 of
the Law Society Act in this way is consistent with the professional regulatory purposes of the Law
Society Act and with the obligations imposed by the Human Rights Code. 
See also Law Society of Upper Canada v Vader, 2013 ONLSHP 8 at para 58: “Consideration of the
existence and consequence of mental health issues only as factors in the penalty phase of a hearing is
ill-conceived, being based on outdated principles.” 
118 See e.g. Law Society of Ontario v Burtt, 2018 ONLSTH 63 at para 83, where the tribunal held, and the
Law Society of Ontario acknowledged, that the law society “has a duty to accommodate a licensee in
an investigation.” On adjournments, see e.g. Law Society of Ontario v Desrochers, 2018 ONLSTH 148
at para 24  [citations omitted], where the panel held that justice, fairness, and the duty to accommodate
will typically support adjournments “where … there is medical evidence that a licensee’s health
difficulties prevent her from being able to participate fully in the Tribunal process.”
119 See e.g. Law Society of Upper Canada v Nobili, 2015 ONLSTH 43 at para 32: capacity proceedings “are
not about denouncing conduct or making findings of character. They relate to the interests of the public
and of licensees that lawyers and paralegals in active practice are able to meet their obligations and thus
reflect confidence in the profession.” See also e.g. Law Society of Upper Canada v Lyon, 2014 ONLSHP
1 at para 22 [emphasis added]: 
The capacity provisions of the Act, which are notably distinct from conduct and competence
applications, serve two primary purposes. First, they ensure that there is a mechanism to protect
the public when a licensee cannot meet his or her obligations for medical reasons. Second, they
recognize that when actions which would otherwise constitute professional misconduct result from
illness or addiction, in some cases it may not be appropriate to treat them as wrongdoing. The
focus in a capacity application is on ensuring that the public interest is protected, not deterrence.
As required by the Human Rights Code, … any orders based on a licensee’s medical condition
must be reasonably necessary to protect the public, and accommodate the disability to the point
of undue hardship.
See also e.g. MH v College of Nurses of Ontario, 2014 CanLII 57012 (Ont HPARB) at para 59: “The
Health Professions Procedural Code addresses the incapacity of members so as to accommodate
disability in a manner consistent with the health and safety of the public.” In the UK context, see e.g.
In the matter of Horan, [2011] Eq LR 473 at paras 44, 56, holding that “an important impairment of his
[a barrister’s] abilities” does not necessarily constitute incapacity, as “in determining the question of
fitness to practise the relevant panel must take account of adjustments which judges can be expected
reasonably to make.”
120 2017 SCC 30 at para 24 [Stewart], quoting Moore v British Columbia (Education), 2012 SCC 61 at para
33. Justices Moldaver and Wagner concurring (at paras 48–50), and Justice Gascon dissenting (at para
60) did not disagree on this point, although Justices Moldaver and Wagner used the term “connection”
as well as “factor” (para 50).
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alone requirement for proving prima facie discrimination,”121 and that “the protected ground
or characteristic need only be ‘a factor’ in the decision,” not a “significant” or “material”
factor.122
The three-part test to justify a prima facie discriminatory standard, reaffirmed by the
Supreme Court of Canada in Hydro-Québec v. Syndicat des employé-e-s de techniques
professionnelles et de bureau d’Hydro-Québec, section locale 2000 (SCFP-FTQ), requires
that the standard have a purpose rationally connected to the performance of the job, an honest
and good faith belief in the necessity of the standard, and the reasonable necessity of the
standard for that purpose.123 Justice Deschamps for the Court emphasized that “[w]hat is
really required is not proof that it is impossible to integrate an employee who does not meet
a standard, but proof of undue hardship, which can take as many forms as there are
circumstances.”124 She elaborated that “the goal of accommodation is to ensure that an
employee who is able to work can do so…. The purpose of the duty to accommodate is to
ensure that persons who are otherwise fit to work are not unfairly excluded where working
conditions can be adjusted without undue hardship.”125 These tests apply with minor
modification to a self-regulating profession. Recall, as described above, that undue hardship
in the context of a self-regulating profession is about the impact on the public interest.126 To
paraphrase Justice Deschamps, the goal is to ensure that a lawyer (or a prospective lawyer)
who is able to practice is allowed to do so. That is, lawyers and prospective lawyers who are
otherwise fit to practice are not unfairly excluded where regulatory demands can be adjusted
without undue hardship. I turn now to such an example.
B. A PRECEDENT: BAR ADMISSIONS QUESTIONS
Other than discipline and capacity proceedings, the other context in which human rights
factors arise in regulated professions is entry to a profession.127 While there have been no
reported human rights challenges, or challenges under the Charter,128 to the duty to report,
and virtually no considerations of these issues in the literature, there is case law and literature
on a similar regulatory tool: fitness questions on applications for bar admission. These
questions are used to screen for fitness to practice issues, with a positive answer leading to
follow-up and potentially denial of admission. Concerns about these questions were first
raised in the Canadian legal literature in 2001 and 2007 by Jocelyn Downie and Sara
Josselyn.129 For example, in British Columbia in 2001, applicants were required to answer,
“Have you ever been treated for schizophrenia, paranoia, or a mood disorder described as a
major affective illness, bipolar mood disorder, or manic depressive illness?”130 And in the
121 Stewart, ibid at para 45.
122 Ibid at para 46.
123 2008 SCC 43 at para 11 [Hydro-Québec], quoting British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations
Commission) v BCGSEU, [1999] 3 SCR 3 at para 54.
124 Hydro-Québec, ibid at para 12.
125 Ibid at para 14.
126 See note 112, above, and accompanying text. 
127 See e.g. Khan, supra note 114 at paras 55–57.
128 Charter, supra note 6.
129 Sara Josselyn, “Bar Mental Fitness Questions: Perpetuating the Stigma” (2007) 16 Dal J Leg Stud 85;
Joceyln Downie, “Law Societies as Arbiters of Mental Fitness” (2001) 24 Adv Q 467.
130 Downie, ibid at 467. This question is no longer asked of applicants: “Application: Law Society
Admission Program Enrolment,” online: <www.lawsociety.bc.ca/Website/media/Shared/docs/forms/
MS-admissions/admission-app.pdf>.
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Yukon, “Have you ever been under treatment for any mental illness?”131 Soon afterward,
such questions were the subject of the leading case on discrimination by a law society,
Gichuru v. The Law Society of British Columbia (No. 4).132
Downie and Josselyn raised several issues with these questions. Downie argued that they
were overinclusive in that they included mental illnesses that would not affect fitness to
practice and underinclusive in that they did not include physical disabilities that might affect
fitness.133 She also suggested that these questions would deter law students from seeking
treatment for mental illness.134 Similarly, Josselyn argued that these questions were
overinclusive in both breadth (they included mental illnesses that would not affect fitness to
practice) and time (they included past mental health status as opposed to merely current
status).135 She also flagged the deterrent effect.136 Both Downie and Josselyn also noted that
law societies have little if any expertise in mental health.137 At a broader level, these
questions have a significant impact on applicants’ privacy interests,138 as well as reinforcing
stigma around mental illness.139 From a legal perspective, Downie suggested that these
questions constitute an infringement of section 15 of the Charter, which failed a section 1
justification at minimal impairment.140 Similarly, Josselyn suggested a section 15
infringement that fails at the rational connection or minimal impairment stage,141 as well as
a breach of human rights legislation.142
The focus in Gichuru was the question above — “[h]ave you ever been treated for
schizophrenia, paranoia, or a mood disorder described as a major affective illness, bipolar
mood disorder, or manic depressive illness?” — as it appeared on applications for articles,
as well as the processes that were engaged by a positive response to the question. The
decision-maker held that the question constituted systemic discrimination against applicants
with mental illness.143 In reaching this conclusion, the decision-maker acknowledged the law
society’s statutory obligation to protect the public interest, which included the assessment
of the “competence and fitness of applicants to practice law.”144 Importantly for my purposes,
the complaint in Gichuru was not about a lack of reasonable accommodation but per se
discrimination.145 As I will explain below, the human right analysis in Gichuru provides a
good model for a human rights analysis of the previous version of the duty to report rule
(with the language of “mental instability”). 
The decision-maker in Gichuru first held that prima facie discrimination was made out.
The protected ground — disability, and specifically the specified mental illnesses — was not
131 Downie, ibid.
132 2009 BCHRT 360 [Gichuru].
133 Downie, supra note 129 at 470–71.
134 Ibid at 474–75.
135 Josselyn, supra note 129 at 95–96.
136 Ibid at 97.
137 Ibid at 106; Downie, supra note 129 at 477.
138 Josselyn, ibid at 101.
139 Ibid at 103.
140 Downie, supra note 129 at 475–76.
141 Josselyn, supra note 129 at 110–11.
142 Ibid at 111.
143 Gichuru, supra note 132 at para 2. Less important for my purposes is the holding of individual
discrimination against Gichuru himself.
144 Ibid at para 494. See also paras 473, 499, 529.
145 Ibid at para 635.
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in issue.146 The key factor here was whether there was adverse treatment: “the Law Society
argues that simply asking a question cannot constitute adverse treatment giving rise to a
prima facie case of discrimination, particularly in the context of the statutory obligation on
the Benchers to be satisfied as to fitness.”147 In rejecting this argument, the decision-maker
acknowledged that not “all applicants answering the Question affirmatively are automatically
denied membership.”148 However, she focused on the process triggered by an affirmative
answer to the question — a more “intrusive” assessment of the application for admission, and
a resulting delay in completing that assessment — as well as the increased likelihood of
conditions being imposed on membership if the applicant was indeed admitted.149 The
connection between the prohibited ground and the adverse treatment was intentional and
“explicit”: “it is precisely the purpose of the Question. Individuals with a number of named
conditions are singled out for increased scrutiny, and a barrier is created for them that is not
present for others.”150
The decision-maker then held that justification failed. While Gichuru argued that the
standard was the obligation to answer the question, and the law society argued that the
standard was “fitness,” the decision-maker instead held that the standard “is that an applicant
must be medically fit to practice law competently.”151 The standard was adopted for the
purpose of meeting the law society’s statutory obligations around competence and fitness and
protection of the public,152 which purpose was rationally connected to the function at hand,153
and the standard was adopted in good faith to meet those statutory obligations.154 However,
the standard was not reasonably necessary to do so, particularly given that the question asked
only about mental disability, not physical disability;155 and only about a partial subset of
mental disabilities that were not defensible on the evidence, including one (“paranoia”) that
was not a medical term;156 and with no time limit;157 and other law societies used narrower
questions;158 and the question did not seem to accomplish the purpose effectively.159 There
were also issues around the process used to adopt the question and the consequences of an
affirmative answer to the question being more severe than positive answers to other
questions.160 I emphasize here, as I will return to below, that the question in Gichuru assumed
that the existence or diagnosis of specified mental illnesses, in themselves, indicated that the
lawyer may be unfit to practice.161
146 Ibid at para 460.
147 Ibid at para 461. 
148 Ibid at para 463.
149 Ibid at paras 463–69.
150 Ibid at para 470.
151 Ibid at paras 493–94. I do note that as the analysis progresses, it seems to treat the rule itself as the
standard in issue.
152 See ibid at para 458: “I do accept, however, that the issue must be viewed in the context of the Law
Society’s statutory authority and obligation to protect the public interest.”
153 Ibid at paras 499–501.
154 Ibid at paras 503–506.
155 Ibid at para 524.
156 Ibid at paras 520, 522–23.
157 Ibid at paras 532–34.
158 Ibid at para 527.
159 Ibid at paras 535–39.
160 Ibid at paras 510–18.
161 See especially ibid at para 470: “it is precisely the purpose of the Question. Individuals with a number
of named conditions are singled out for increased scrutiny, and a barrier is created for them that is not
present for others.” See also para 502: 
At some points in his argument, Mr. Gichuru raised the issue of whether there is, in fact, a rational
connection between a past diagnosis of mental illness and a present impairment. However, he did
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I note that the law society in Gichuru invoked the harm-to-the-public-interest concept of
undue hardship: 
[T]hat it would suffer undue hardship, and that it would be contrary to the public interest, to require it to
admit an applicant … or approve an applicant for Call and Admission, without objective and complete
information necessary to enable the Benchers to be satisfied that the applicant was in fact fit to undertake the
duties and responsibilities involved in the practice of law.162 
The decision-maker, however, essentially responded that the law society remained able to
ask relevant questions in a non-discriminatory way: “[t]his decision should not be taken as
a finding that the Law Society is not entitled to ask any question, or make any enquiries,
relating to medical fitness to practice law competently. It is simply a finding that, as currently
formulated, the Question has a discriminatory effect that has not been justified by the Law
Society.”163 In so doing, she presaged the holding described above that regulators have a duty
to protect the public interest while complying with human rights law.164 
C. RULE 7.1-3
Against this context, I now analyze how rule 7.1-3 interacts with human rights law. First
I consider the previous version of the rule (with the language of “mental instability”), and
then I contrast it with the current version of the rule.
At the outset, I acknowledge that each law society’s specific version of rule 7.1-3 would
be measured against the specific human rights law in force in the corresponding province or
territory. Nonetheless, the similarities among the various rules and the similarities among the
various human rights laws (and particularly the unifying impact of the interpretation of these
laws by the Supreme Court of Canada) allow me to draw meaningful conclusions from a
general analysis of the model rule itself.
As I outlined above, prior to March 2016, the model rule dealt with mental illness
differently. Instead of “conduct that raises a substantial question about the lawyer’s
capacity to provide professional services,”165 it referred to “the mental instability of a lawyer
of such a nature that the lawyer’s clients are likely to be materially prejudiced.”166 As part
of the 2016 amendments, the heading was changed from “Duty to Report Misconduct” to its
current “Duty to Report.”167
As discussed above, Devlin, Downie, and Wildeman argued that the previous rule was
discriminatory, particularly in singling out mental illness among other factors potentially
not call any evidence in this regard, and he did not seek to have Dr. O’Shaughnessy attend for
cross-examination. As a result, there is no evidence before me that contradicts Dr.
O’Shaughnessy’s opinion supporting the proposition that the purpose outlined above is rationally
connected to the Law Society’s function of assessing the fitness and competence of applicants, and
I find that there is such a rational connection.
162 Ibid at para 544.
163 Ibid at para 545.
164 See note 113, above, and accompanying text.
165 FLSC Model Code, supra note 7, March 2016.
166 Ibid, October 2014.
167 Ibid.
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affecting a lawyer’s capacity to practice and in the heading’s implication that mental illness
in itself constitutes misconduct and also because “mental instability” is a term with no clear
definition and a state that lawyers are unqualified to assess.168
The previous “mental instability” rule was discriminatory under human rights law in a
way remarkably similar to the admissions question in Gichuru. The key foundation for the
analysis is that being reported under the rule constituted adverse treatment — in other words,
that the making of a report about a lawyer led to, or could potentially lead to, an investigation
of that lawyer, which could lead to consequences such as license suspension or revocation
for incapacity. It is clear that this result is necessary for the question to accomplish its
purpose. Like the question in Gichuru, the previous “mental instability” rule invoked a
protected ground (disability); the rule required reports that led directly to adverse treatment
(or the risk of adverse treatment) of reported lawyers, and the reports were specifically
triggered by the protected ground. 
Like the question in Gichuru, a justification of the previous rule would pass the first step
of the analysis, that the standard was adopted for a purpose rationally connected to the
function.169 Here the standard is best defined as the requirement that other lawyers report
lawyers for “mental instability.”170 Likewise, the rule was presumably adopted to meet the
law societies’ statutory obligations around competence and fitness and protection of the
public, and the reporting rule was rationally connected to the function of ensuring the
sufficiently effective practice of law.171
However, even presuming that the previous rule (on mental instability) was adopted in
good faith, the rule was not reasonably necessary to protect the public, given that it covered
only “mental instability” and not physical disabilities affecting capacity to practice and that
“mental instability” is not a legal or medical term of art.172 This emphasis on diagnosis,
instead of conduct, as well as omission of physical disability or illness, invokes
discriminatory stereotypes of persons with mental illness.
In contrast, the current version of the rule appears to comply with human rights law,
capturing as it does mental illness under “conduct that raises a substantial question about the
168 See e.g Devlin, Downie & Wildeman, supra note 1 at 21.
169 Gichuru, supra note 132 at paras 499–501.
170 I acknowledge that, in the alternative and following Gichuru strictly, the standard could be defined as
the requirement of fitness or capacity. However, the result of the analysis would be the same. Moreover,
defining the standard as the reporting rule itself provides for a clearer analysis.
171 See note 152, above, and accompanying text. See e.g. Brar and others v BC Veterinary Medical
Association and Osborne, 2015 BCHRT 151 at para 426 of Appendix U: “One of the BCVMA’s
purposes is protection of the public. In order to achieve this goal, it must be reasonably assured that an
applicant is reasonably medically fit to practise. In this respect, I accept that such a standard is rationally
connected to the function of practicing veterinary medicine.” See also Van Leening v College of Physical
Therapists, 2006 BCHRT 357 at para 51 [emphasis added], on the registration standards of the College
that required physiotherapists to be able to perform the physical tasks that constituted the practice of
physiotherapy: 
The College is required by law to create registration standards. The registration standards relate
to the functions performed; the treatment of the injured. The College adopted the standards in good
faith; to ensure that the objects of the College are met and to accomplish its purpose or goal to
serve and protect the public. The College was accountable for addressing Mr. Van Leening’s
situation, without sacrificing its legitimate objects, including protecting the public.
172 Devlin, Downie & Wildeman, supra note 1 at 21.
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lawyer’s capacity to provide professional services” and removing the reference to
“misconduct” in the title.173
The current rule remains prima facie discriminatory. The phrase “conduct that raises a
substantial question about the lawyer’s capacity to provide professional services” connects
to the protected ground of disability. While the FLSC Model Code does not define
“capacity,”174 the commentary to the reporting rule clearly illustrate that the concern is
disability: “[i]nstances of conduct described in this rule can arise from a variety of stressors,
physical, mental or emotional conditions, disorders or addictions.”175 Like the previous rule,
a report about a lawyer has the potential to lead to an investigation and potentially to capacity
or disciplinary proceedings and a suspension or revocation of the lawyer’s licence.176
The current rule is, however, likely justifiable. Like the previous “mental instability” rule,
the current rule was presumably adopted to meet the law societies’ statutory obligations
around competence and fitness and protection of the public, and the reporting rule was
rationally connected to the function of ensuring the sufficiently effective practice of law. The
current rule was evidently adopted in good faith in order to replace the previous
discriminatory rule. Unlike the previous “mental instability” rule, the current rule is
reasonably necessary to the protection of the public. As I mentioned above, a law society
cannot protect the public interest by regulating capacity unless it becomes aware of capacity
problems. Impeding the protection of the public interest would constitute undue hardship.
Moreover, the current rule covers all impediments to capacity, not just mental illness. And
unlike the previous rule and the question in Gichuru, the current rule focuses not on a
diagnosis, which lawyers are unable to identify and which in itself does not impede capacity,
but on the conduct, which lawyers are more likely to be able to identify and which
demonstrates a risk of impeded capacity. 
Following Gichuru, justification might fail if reports about conduct related to capacity
under rule 7.1-3(e) were treated differently, that is, they resulted in more negative adverse
treatment, than reports about conduct related to “honesty, trustworthiness, or competency”
under 7.1-3(d), or any of the other reportable circumstances in rule 7.1-3.177
I do note here that the current Quebec rule,178 with its reference to “a health condition that
could materially prejudice a client,”179 is likely also justifiable under human rights law. While
the focus is on the condition itself instead of the conduct is problematic, the qualifier — “that
could materially prejudice a client”180 — is narrow and specifically suited to the objective
of protecting the public. 
173 FLSC Model Code, supra note 7, r 7.1-3.
174 Ibid, r 1.1-1.
175 Ibid, r 7.1-3, commentary 3.
176 Ibid, preface.
177 Gichuru, supra note 132.
178 See note 20, above.
179 Quebec Code, supra note 20, s 134(5).
180 Ibid, s 134(5).
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IV.  RULE 7.1-3 AND THE
CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS
While my focus in this article is human rights law, the previous “mental instability” rule
likely unjustifiably infringed section 15 of the Charter whereas the current rule does not
infringe section 15 or, if it does, that infringement is justified under section 1. As mentioned
above, there are no reported challenges to the rule under the Charter. As in the human rights
analysis above, each law society’s specific version of rule 7.1-3 would be measured against
section 15; nonetheless, the similarities among the various rules allow me to draw
meaningful conclusions from a Charter analysis of the model rule itself.
I note at the outset that the Supreme Court of Canada has explicitly stated that a
reasonable accommodation analysis under human rights law is distinct from a justification
analysis under section 1 of the Charter.181 Thus, although I argue that the outcome of a
Charter challenge to the rule would be the same as the outcome of a human rights challenge
to the rule, the corresponding analyses are different.
The Charter clearly applies to law societies, including their administrative decisions and
the rules of professional conduct themselves.182 This includes section 15 of the Charter:
“[e]very individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection
and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination
based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical
disability.”183 Section 15 is engaged where there is a discriminatory distinction on an
enumerated or analogous ground:
The first part of the s. 15 analysis therefore asks whether, on its face or in its impact, a law creates a
distinction on the basis of an enumerated or analogous ground….The second part of the analysis focuses on
arbitrary — or discriminatory — disadvantage, that is, whether the impugned law fails to respond to the
actual capacities and needs of the members of the group and instead imposes burdens or denies a benefit in
a manner that has the effect of reinforcing, perpetuating or exacerbating their disadvantage.184
Both the previous rule and the current rule satisfy the first part of the test by drawing a
distinction based on the enumerated ground of disability, meaning the section 15 analysis
turns on the second part of the test.
181 Alberta v Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, 2009 SCC 37 at paras 66–71 [Hutterian Brethren]. Note
that this is an implicit rejection of Eldridge v British Columbia (Attorney General), [1997] 3 SCR 624
at para 79 [Eldridge]: “[R]easonable accommodation … is best addressed as a component of the s. 1
analysis.” Although I refer below to Eldridge, I do so with this caution in mind. See also Jennifer
Koshan, “Under the Influence: Discrimination Under Human Rights Legislation and Section 15 of the
Charter” (2014) 3 Can J Human Rights 115 at 139–42.
182 Charter, supra note 6. On decision-making, see e.g. Doré v Barreau du Québec, 2012 SCC 12 at paras
2-6; Histed v Law Society of Manitoba, 2007 MBCA 150 at para 93 [Histed], leave to appeal to SCC
refused, [2008] SCCA No 67, 32478 (24 April 2008). On the rules of professional conduct themselves,
see e.g. Histed at para 57; see also Re Klein and Law Society of Upper Canada (1985), 50 OR (2d) 118,
(Div Ct) at 157–58 (Callaghan J), 126 (Henry J dissenting but not on this point).
183 Charter, ibid, s 15(1). Section 15(2) is not relevant for my purposes.
184 Kahkewistahaw First Nation v Taypotat, 2015 SCC 30 at paras 19–20, Justice Abella for the Court
[Taypotat], reaffirmed in Centrale des syndicats du Québec v Quebec (Attorney General), 2018 SCC
18 at para 22, Justice Abella for the majority, Chief Justice McLachlin dissenting but concurring on this
point at para 154.
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The previous rule (on “mental instability”) clearly constituted an infringement of section
15 of the Charter. Persons with mental illness are unquestionably a historically
disadvantaged group.185 Following the Supreme Court of Canada’s approach to section 15
in Taypotat, the imperative that lawyers with “mental instability” — a term with neither a
medical nor legal meaning, and, for example, not lawyers with a physical disability — be
reported to the law society reinforces, perpetuates, and exacerbates that disadvantage.186
While it is unclear following Taypotat what the precise role is in section 15 for stereotyping
and prejudice,187 it is clear that mandatory reporting of “mental instability” perpetuates
stereotyping and prejudice. That is, the rule itself both perpetuates disadvantage and
reinforces stereotypes about the abilities of people with mental illness, the impact of a mental
illness on a person’s functioning, and the stigmatization of mental illness relative to physical
illness.188 As the Supreme Court of Canada recognized in Granovsky, section 15 is powerful
in requiring the state to reorient its treatment of persons with disabilities by avoiding
stigmatization or stereotyping:
What s. 15 of the Charter can do, and it is a role of immense importance, is address the way in which the
state responds to people with disabilities. Section 15(1) ensures that governments may not, intentionally or
through a failure of appropriate accommodation, stigmatize the underlying physical or mental impairment,
or attribute functional limitations to the individual that the underlying physical or mental impairment does
not entail, or fail to recognize the added burdens which persons with disabilities may encounter in achieving
self-fulfillment in a world relentlessly oriented to the able-bodied.189
I emphasize that section 15, in this context, is about how the law society responds to people
with disabilities and prohibits stigmatization or incorrect attribution of functional limitations.
The previous rule would fail justification under section 1 of the Charter as a “reasonable
limi[t] prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic
society.”190 The objective — protecting the public interest in sufficiently effective practice
of law — is sufficiently pressing and substantial.191 Indeed, in a section 1 justification
185 See e.g. Eldridge, supra note 181 at para 56 [citations omitted]:
It is an unfortunate truth that the history of disabled persons in Canada is largely one of exclusion
and marginalization.  Persons with disabilities have too often been excluded from the labour force,
denied access to opportunities for social interaction and advancement, subjected to invidious
stereotyping and relegated to institutions.… This historical disadvantage has to a great extent been
shaped and perpetuated by the notion that disability is an abnormality or flaw.  As a result,
disabled persons have not generally been afforded the “equal concern, respect and consideration”
that s. 15(1) of the Charter demands.  Instead, they have been subjected to paternalistic attitudes
of pity and charity, and their entrance into the social mainstream has been conditional upon their
emulation of able-bodied norms.
186 Taypotat, supra note 184 at para 20.
187 See e.g. Alicia Puchta, “Quebec v A and Taypotat: Unpacking the Supreme Court’s Latest Decisions on
Section 15 of the Charter” (2018) 55:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 665 at 690.
188 See e.g. Granovsky v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), 2000 SCC 28 at paras 27, 29,
[Granovsky]: 
Unlike gender or ethnic origin, which generally stamp each member of the class with a singular
characteristic, disabilities vary in type, intensity and duration across the full range of personal
physical or mental characteristics.… The concept of disability must therefore accommodate a
multiplicity of impairments, both physical and mental, overlaid on a range of functional
limitations, real or perceived, interwoven with recognition that in many important aspects of life
the so-called “disabled” individual may not be impaired or limited in any way at all.
189 Ibid at para 33 [emphasis added].
190 Charter, supra note 6, s 1.
191 See both the Canadian and American literature, above notes 1 and 96 and accompanying text. 
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analysis, it is the societal perspective that is determinative.192 However, the rule would likely
fail at rational connection, and certainly at minimal impairment, given its non-medical and
non-legal concept of “mental instability,” its omission of physical disability, and its focus on
diagnosis instead of conduct. The rule would fail at the final balancing step of section 1 for
similar reasons.
In contrast, the current rule would almost certainly be justifiable under section 1 and might
not even infringe section 15. While the current rule creates a distinction based on the
analogous ground of disability, its focus on conduct instead of diagnosis does not impose
“arbitrary disadvantage” in the meaning of Taypotat193 and arguably does not illustrate or
reinforce prejudice or stereotyping about people with disabilities — that is, it corresponds
with the “the actual capacities and needs of the members of the group” of persons to whom
it applies.194 Moreover, it no longer singles out (and stigmatizes) mental illness or brands it
misconduct. Thus the current rule may not infringe section 15.
Even if it did infringe section 15, the current rule would likely be justifiable under section
1. Like the previous rule, it has a pressing and substantial objective. Unlike the previous rule,
it would pass rational connection and minimal impairment and balancing. The rule is
carefully tailored to provide for the adequate protection of the public interest with the
minimum possible imposition on lawyers with disabilities — namely, to only require the
reporting of disability that goes to capacity to practice. Without this information, the law
societies cannot effectively regulate the profession. And while there still may well be
negative impacts on lawyers with disabilities, the protection of the public interest is a benefit
that outweighs these negative impacts. Moreover, lawyers accept restrictions on their Charter
rights that do not apply to, and would not be justifiable for, the general public.195
V.  RECOMMENDATIONS
In this part, I propose amendments to the rule and make related recommendations. The
replacement of the “mental instability” language not only makes the reporting duty compliant
with human rights law but indeed is a commendable change that vastly improves the rule as
it relates to lawyers with mental illness. Despite the fact that the current rule complies with
human rights law and the Charter, improvements can still be made. Similarly, while
modernization of the rule is a promising step in law societies’ approaches to mental illness
among lawyers, further steps remain. 
192 Hutterian Brethren, supra note 181 at para 69.
193 Taypotat, supra note 184 at para 20.
194 Ibid. 
195 See e.g. Histed, supra note 182 at para 79: 
While litigants and other interested persons may comment publicly on cases before the courts and
may criticize judicial decisions in terms which some might consider offensive, lawyers are bound
by the constraints of the professional standards which apply to all members of the legal
profession…. [I]f Histed wishes to have that same unfettered right to criticize the administration
of justice, he may do so, but not while a member of the Law Society.
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A. AMENDMENTS TO RULE 7.1-3
The rule should be amended in several ways. Three of these would make the rule and its
requirements more precise. Most importantly, the rule should specifically indicate the
threshold that triggers the duty to report. Given the screening function of the rule, and the
holding in Lang Michener (Re), reasonable suspicion, specifically reasonable grounds to
suspect, is an appropriate threshold.196 In the alternative, reasonable belief would also be
appropriate. Similarly, the required timeliness of the report should be specified. Given the
potential need for prompt law society investigation and action, the standard should be “as
soon as possible” or, if that is too strict, “promptly.”197 A clearer and more definite rule
would provide lawyers with mental illness with more certainty about when they may be the
subject of a report. It might also reduce the opportunity for lawyers to justify their non-
compliance to themselves and among their colleagues.
The rule could also be improved by an anti-retaliation provision. As in the Human Rights
Code context, both retaliation and the threat of retaliation should be addressed. For example,
“[n]o lawyer shall retaliate against, or threaten to retaliate against, another lawyer for making
a report under this rule.” In the alternative, a blanket provision could be used that would
prohibit any negative treatment by a lawyer against another lawyer for complying or
attempting to comply with his or her obligations under the Code of Professional Conduct, the
rules and bylaws of the Law Society, or related legislation. Such amendments would likely
improve compliance with the reporting duty.
The FLSC should consider an exception to the reporting requirement for mental illness
among lawyers in close personal relationships.198 In this narrow context, the benefits of
reporting are likely outweighed by the deterrence effect. Lawyers with mental illness should
be able to disclose their illness to spouses or children who happen to be lawyers without fear
of being reported. This disclosure may be an important step in acknowledging and addressing
mental illness.
B. OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS
Important steps around the duty to report go beyond amendments to the text of rule 7.1-3.
As a first step, law societies should re-examine the processes and responses that are triggered
by a report under rule 7.1-3, including those triggered by a report of “conduct that raises a
substantial question about the lawyer’s capacity to provide professional services,”199 to
ensure that persons with mental illness are not exposed to harsher treatment than persons
reported under other parts of the rule. A related step would be to provide further transparency
around how the law society processes and responds to these reports. Another step would be
196 Supra note 50.
197 While Montbriand, supra note 17 at 242 suggests “une norme qui s’assimilerait à celle d’un délai
raisonnable” [“a standard which would be equated to that of a reasonable time” – translated by author]
more precision is necessary in my view. Montbriand also notes at 241 that rule 7.1-4 uses a “as soon as
reasonably practicable” standard.
198 In the American literature, see Greenbaum, supra note 99 at 319. (I note here Greenbaum’s suggestion
at 319 that such an exemption may not be necessary because disciplinary boards likely already take such
relationships into consideration when determining whether to impose sanctions. However, transparency
and clarity of expectations favour such an exemption.)
199 FLSC Model Code, supra note 7, r 7.1-3(e).
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to continue to emphasize diversion and other initiatives to decrease reliance on disciplinary
and capacity proceedings in response to these reports.200 If lawyers understand and believe
that reported lawyers will be treated fairly and compassionately, and more specifically will
not be discriminated against by the regulator or other lawyers — and that reporting will
prevent more serious problems — they should be more likely to comply with their reporting
obligations. A broader step would be to emphasize the duty of the individual lawyer to assist
the law society in the protection of the public interest and how that duty is a key corollary
to the privilege of self-regulation, while continuing to attempt to decrease the stigma around
reporting other lawyers while emphasizing all lawyers’ “special responsibility to respect the
requirements of human rights laws.”201
VI.  CONCLUSION
In this article, I have analyzed the rule requiring lawyers to report other lawyers to the law
society, with a special focus on mental illness. Based on this analysis, I concluded that the
2016 amendments bring the reporting rule into compliance with human rights law, but that
there remains more for the law societies to do to meet the spirit of human rights legislation.
Moreover, further amendments to the rule would improve its utility for the regulation of the
legal profession in the public interest.
Further changes to and around rule 7.1-3 are a necessary part of law societies’ continuing
embrace of their obligations under both the letter and spirit of human rights law, to show that
the same standard applies to the regulator as to individual lawyers, namely, “a special
responsibility to respect the requirements of human rights laws in force in Canada, its
provinces and territories and, specifically, to honour the obligations enumerated in human
rights laws.”202
The law societies have a statutory mandate to protect the public interest by ensuring
lawyers meet rigorous standards of both competence and capacity. The reporting rule plays
— or could play — an important role in fulfilling that mandate but only if lawyers comply.
At the end of the day, disciplinary enforcement of the duty to report will be a weak or even
counterproductive strategy to improve compliance. It will be rare situations in which the
society can detect, and prove, that a lawyer had awareness of another lawyer’s conduct that
would be sufficient to trigger the reporting duty. Instead, law societies should commit to
demonstrating to the profession that reports will be dealt with fairly and compassionately and
that reporting a lawyer may allow early intervention that indeed prevents the reported lawyer
from greater trouble in the future.
200 See e.g. the Nova Scotia Barristers’ Society’s Fitness to Practice Program: “Complaints,” online: <nsbs.
org/legal-profession/your-practice/complaints>.
201 FLSC Model Code, supra note 7, r 6.3-5, commentary 1.
202 Ibid.
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